E. Barton Geer, associate chief of. Langley's Flight Vehicle an. Systems Division during the Apollo. Apollo 2. 04 Review Board. And just as we got to the transonic field. And you just get that pretty well understood and, Holy. Smoke, here we are going to the Moon and things like that.- Floyd L. Thompson, Langley director and. Apollo 2. 04 Review Board. The Purple Digit: An Algorithmic Approach to Diagnosis. The Albatross travels from England to the New World in 1675, with a number of passengers, a couple of political prisoners along with a dozen other women convicts. The crowning moment, as well as the. Armstrong and. realization of this spectacular moment required the most sudden burst. At. its peak the Apollo program employed approximately 4. Americans. and enlisted the support of over 2. As President Kennedy had said in his May 1. For all of us must work to put him. To be. sure, Langley did not serve as the heart of the Apollo program, as it. STG left for. Texas.
Apollo would not be managed by any of the field centers but by. Office of Manned. Space Flight at NASA headquarters. Of course, the spaceflight centers. Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston and the Marshall Space. One of the causes for the panic of 1893 can be traced back to Argentina. Investment was encouraged by the Argentine agent bank, Baring Brothers. Deceased FBI Agent Found At Trump Tower With Silenced Pistol incredibLe. Trump oughTa know the other side don't pLay fair. Flight Center in Huntsville) were deeply involved. A large. well- funded Apollo program office at Houston was responsible for the. Apollo spacecraft; moreover, Houston was the home of. Mission Control, the nerve center of NASA's manned flight operations. Cape Kennedy. At Marshall the von Braun team handled the awesome task. Saturn rocket. 2 These were the. NASA centers where the staff . But. neither Langley nor any of the other NASA facilities were left out. There was too much work to do, too much to learn. All NASA centers eventually became heavily. Houston and. Huntsville, none was more involved than Langley. Yet, when it came to the Apollo flights. Langley and the other. By the time the Apollo. Saturn V at Launch Complex 3. A at. Kennedy Space Center in July 1. I am a Vietnam Vet and I have Parkinson's. Are you a Vietnam Vet or have you had exposure to Agent Orange and do you have Parkinson's. ACE Research Area: Agent-Based Macroeconomics Last Updated: 2 October 2016. Langley's contributions to the. Apollo program had already been made and mostly forgotten. That. after all, was the purpose and the predicament of a research center. Of. course, John Houbolt's concept of LOR would not be forgotten in the. Apollo 1. 1, nor would the flights of the Lunar. Orbiter spacecraft. But many other elemental tasks that Langley had. Apollo would not be remembered: the basic. Saturn- Apollo launch combination, the. Apollo spacecraft, and the simulation training that helped. From launch to. splashdown, there was no aspect of the Apollo mission that. Langley had not helped to. All this work, however, had been done. Apollo astronauts skillfully maneuvered their. Eagle down to the Sea of Tranquility on that historic. July 1. 96. 9. All that Langley employees could do on that hot. Sunday afternoon in July was sit in front of televisions in their own. It was the original (and for over 2. NACA center, not to mention the . Langley management was not accustomed to being in a. Members of the local Hampton elite did not. For them and other groups of Langley supporters, the. STG for Texas. The bitterness over this did not. On occasion, concern for Langley's displacement led. For example, in. December 1. James Webb's first visit to Langley after. NASA administrator, Floyd Thompson, as savvy a person as. Langley director's chair, mentioned to Webb that the. Webb responded sharply with a statement that echoed. President Kennedy's inaugural address. Webb, Apollo was everything, and he wanted assurances from the center. Then in his. deliberate and rather high- pitched midwestern voice, he reported with. Well, we have a senior man in Houston who keeps track of. He had no idea that such a thing was going on down in. Houston or that the Houston organization would even allow it, but he. Thompson at his word. The Langley center director did have a . In April 1. 96. 2, which was a few. STG had completed its move to the Southwest. Thompson had dispatched Langley veteran Axel T. Mattson to Houston to. Manned Spacecraft Projects. The. experienced assistant chief of the Full- Scale Research. Division.. L- 6. 1- 8. Mattson was to report his findings to. Langley Associate Director Charles Donlan, Thompson's right- hand. This was an interesting and unusual. NASA center had such an arrangement, and. Langley could have gotten away with it. It had to do with the way the funding was set up; this was the. For everything Langley was doing in support. Office of Manned Space Flight and Apollo, it was my assignment. Houston, which was getting a. Langley, which wasn't. Donlan. had told him, . I dealt almost exclusively with the troops in the. In the evening, he socialized at the many. Houston area cocktail and dinner parties, where he made the important. Besides. enjoying convivial relations with his Houston buddies, many of whom. Langley, Mattson also developed close professional. NASA contractor. representatives. These relationships allowed him to tap a gushing. Apollo related technical data. Through this technological espionage, Mattson. Langley. Whenever an. Houston. engineers and industry representatives, Mattson would say, . I went over to. their offices the next day and they just gave it to me. It would come in my. Mattson tried to feel out. I'd bring. them back to Langley and have the guys look at it and say, 'How about. He. admits now that he occasionally would . Such goodies made Mattson something. At some point in such proceedings, Mattson remembers. Floyd Thompson would typically pause and joke, . Other centers were left out in the cold. Sometimes those. who knew about Langley's operation tried to tap Mattson for. Certainly this. would not have been possible without the good graces of Gilruth, who. Floyd Thompson's good friend. Not everyone at the Manned. Spacecraft Center wanted Mattson nosing around. In one meeting not. Houston center, Gilruth was surprised. Mattson and wanted to know what Mattson was doing there. Mattson had stayed as far away. Faget as possible, knowing that the former member of PARD and. STG did not like him or the idea of his walking the halls of the. Houston space center. To the extent that he reported to anyone at. Houston, Mattson dealt exclusively with Paul Purser, Gilruth's deputy. Langley veteran. Purser knew what. Mattson was up to, generally speaking, but for a short period of time. Immediately after that first encounter with. Mattson, Gilruth called both Purser and Mattson . Mattson explained. Thompson and Donlan wanted out of it, and. Gilruth grudgingly gave his okay. Whether Gilruth ever brought up the. Mattson's presence in Houston with his former Langley. Thompson and Donlan, is unknown, but he probably did. In key respects, the assignment was a. Mattson's own admission, it forced him to neglect his family in. Virginia. 1. 3 But such sacrifices were consistent with the demands. Gilruth (center), the Houston center director. Mattson's presence. The identity of the. NASA overalls is unknown. As discussed in chapter eight, in early 1. Houston, Mattson helped win support for John Houbolt's LOR concept. Texas center. Mattson. Houbolt to every person Mattson thought might be willing to. Mattson's opinion, the. A few months later, thanks to some rather keen technical. NASA might need to assure the. Apollo command module, Mattson made. NASA record. The story of that contribution begins three. Mattson's arrival in Houston - that was when Mattson. Apollo command module. The North. American Aviation Corporation, which in November 1. Apollo spacecraft, had built a swimming- pool- like facility with a big. Space Information Systems. Division in Downey, California; the purpose of this facility was to. In late 1. 96. 2 and early. North American and NASA engineers had already put the command. Apollo capsule configuration. Inside the capsule the engineers were even installing. Mattson became interested in the details of. He made contacts with some of the informed NASA. From his knowledge of similar capsule drop tests carried out in. Back River at Langley on the Mercury capsule, he understood that. First, a flexible bottom surface. Apollo command module, would cave in or. Second, when transducers were put on a. Langley engineers had found that the pressure. And that was what busted things up . It wasn't all that other. It was that instant spike. This. solution had worked perfectly. Stubbs was then conducting. Mattson asked Stubbs if he was getting any data on. Apollo command module. Stubbs. answered that he had no such data; he was not using the Apollo. North American's capsule design was already. That was not the answer. Mattson wanted to hear, so he tried coaxing Stubbs into adding an. Apollo model to his test. Stubbs replied that he was . If Mattson could obtain the funding, Stubbs told Langley's. Houston, then he would be glad to go ahead with the. Mattson made an appointment with the Manned. Spacecraft Center's Joseph N. Kotanchik, NASA's main technical. North American. contract. Kotanchik, like many of the other Houston officials, was a. Langley old- timer; he had been a key member of the design team that. Langley's Structures Research Laboratory in 1. Perhaps it was. because Kotanchik was quite formal, a northerner, and an MIT. Mattson was usually informal, a loquacious. New. Jersey), who was educated at North Carolina State University in. Raleigh. Perhaps the friction also stemmed from the professional. Kotanchik had experienced while at Langley. If Mattson. had not had previous dealings with Kotanchik, he would not have even. Mattson usually just walked into. No one just walked in on Kotanchik except his bosses. Kotanchik did not want to be bothered with. Mattson and told him to be quick. Mattson promptly asked for a. Sandy Stubbs's impact loads. Apollo command module at Langley. According to Mattson, Kotanchik said, ? Don't you know that it will get us all the information we. You just momentarily got shook up, but then forgot about it. But I put it on the back burner and I made my contacts. North American. Donlan, understanding the good sense of what. Mattson was trying to do, told him to tell Sandy Stubbs to go ahead. Apollo command module in his tests. Stubbs wanted to do the systematic testing anyway. Langley. management would just have to find another way to pay for. By the day of the big drop test in California. September 1. 96. 4, Mattson had developed such good rapport with.
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